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Abstract: An increasing number of firms are engaging in social and environmental initiatives beyond 
their core business activities. While much has been written on the question of why business should be 
spending resources on social and environmental causes, relatively few studies have systematically 
addressed the question of why companies actually do engage in such activities. A notable exception is 
literature on the ‘business case’ for corporate social responsibility, which argues that good social and 
environmental performance will positively affect a company’s financial results. Empirical evidence, 
however, has failed to prove this. Moreover, even if there is an economic rationale, it is not clear why 
some companies engage in social activities while others do not. And, why do many more companies 
today ‘see’ the business case than in the past? Our paper attempts to conceptualise the motives of 
companies to engage or not to engage in such activities. Drawing on theories from Management 
Studies, Sociology, Political Science and International Relations, we suggest modifying the notion of 
the business case by opening the black box of the corporation’s identity as a social actor. 
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1. Introduction 
Why do transnational corporations (TNCs) engage in voluntary social activities4 and how can 
we theorise about this? In recent years, the number of TNCs has increased considerably and 
their operations have spread rapidly around the globe. This expansion lies at the heart of 
many debates about the social and political implications of globalisation. While some see 
TNCs as agents of development and progress who create jobs, technological know-how and 
management experience and, at times, even substitute for weak government, others argue that 
TNCs have skewed development in many parts of the world and weakened states’ abilities to 
harness potential benefits of economic globalisation. It is suggested that global competition 
has given TNCs power to dictate the conditions under which they operate and detracted from 
the ability of states to tax, regulate and direct investment to areas that will be socially 
beneficial (Reich 2007; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2003). TNCs are blamed for exploiting 
people and resources and are sometimes even held responsible for the persistent inequality 
across and within countries. Yet, there is significant evidence that TNCs often engage in a 
variety of social and environmental endeavours that aim to and often do positively impact the 
societies in which they operate. This paper seeks to explain the complex motivations for 
TNCs’ social activities and proposes that understanding motivations provides important 
insights into the boundaries and possibilities of such activity for addressing social issues.  
 
Our main contribution in this paper is to map the theoretical terrain and categorise the various 
existing explanations for corporate social engagement. In the past decade, corporate social 
activity has attracted growing attention in the academic literature. Besides critical-normative 
                                                 
4 Voluntary social activities, as referred to in this paper, are concerned with the welfare of companies’ 
employees, their families, the community and larger society and environment in which they operate. 
Such activities include the implementation of labour standards, health and safety provisions, 
environmental protection, upholding human rights, providing housing, healthcare and education. They 
can be undertaking either directly and be limited to the firm level or indirectly through participation in 
governance schemes. Our definition covers forms of corporate social engagement that are not required 
by law – either because a legal obligation does not exist or is not enforced, as in many developing 
countries. We explicitly do not use the term CSR, partly because it suffers from a lack of clear 
definition, and partly because the term ‘responsibility’ conveys the notion of an obligation. Our 
analysis does not take a normative angle but investigates companies’ motivations to engage in social 
activities.  
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or descriptive-evaluative work on TNCs (Friedman 1970; Jensen 2002; Porter and Kramer 
2002; Prahalad and Hammond 2003), scholars in the fields of international relations (Hauffler 
2003; Ruggie 2004; Boerzle and Risse 2005; Haslam 2007), international political economy 
(Strange 1994; Pauly 1997; Mattli 2001; Levy and Newell 2005; May 2006), economic 
sociology (Gereffi 1996, 1994; Vogel 2006), international law (Leader 2001, 1999, 1995; 
Sanders 1982) and management studies (for reviews on the literature, see Margolis and Walsh 
2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003) have contributed to a growing literature on this subject.  
 
The different disciplines take different approaches to the study of TNCs’ social activities. 
Scholars from management studies have taken a firm-level perspective and distinguished 
between ‘strategic’ and ‘moral’ drivers of corporate social engagement (Branco and 
Rodrigues 2006; Graafland and van de Ven 2006). In a comprehensive review of the literature 
on CSR, Margolis and Walsh (2003) find that factors other than financial performance have 
been largely ignored. Also, Lee (2008: 53) argues that “future research needs to … develop 
conceptual tools and theoretical mechanisms that explain changing organisational behaviour 
from a broader societal perspective.” International relations and international political 
economy scholars have investigated TNCs’ role in shaping international politics and the 
design and implementation of global governance arrangements (see Ruggie 2004; Gereffi et 
al. 2001). This literature conceptualises the TNC as a black box, motivated by profit 
maximisation and constrained by its market and regulatory environments. Campell (2007) 
notes the need for more theorising on corporate motivation. In doing so, we add to the 
existing literature on the political economy of corporate responsibility, which has given 
limited attention to the question of motivation in a broad perspective (Campbell 2007; 
Rowley and Berman 2000).  
 
Our main contention is that the motivations of corporations to engage in social activities can 
be fully understood only by evaluating the internal and external environments in which firms 
operate, and by combining a focus on particular agents of change with an understanding of 
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the structural factors that impact their actions and decision-making. We start by identifying 
variables to explain corporate social engagement along two dimensions – external versus 
internal factors and agent versus structure. We develop a matrix that draws upon literature on 
social activities of firms in multiple disciplines, including economic sociology, organisation 
theory, management, political science and international relations. This paper critically 
evaluates each set of explanations, and argues that none on its own sufficiently accounts for 
the timing, scope and nature of corporate social activity. Instead, we contend that a full 
understanding of corporate behaviour requires comparative analyses that bring together all 
four dimensions of motivation.  
 
Developing an alternative approach to the study of TNCs is only meaningful if it produces 
new insights and guidance for future research. We argue that the approach we develop in this 
article enhances current debates in the field in at least three ways: First, it offers a perspective 
on TNCs as social actors rather than focussing solely on their economic activities. Secondly, 
strengthening the theoretical basis for studying the social behaviour of firms opens up new 
insights and opportunities for research in the field of business-government relations and 
public-private mixes in policy and regulatory arrangements. Finally, we argue that it is useful 
to more fully exploit the terrain of available theoretical approaches to explaining TNC 
behaviour because each approach captures different dimensions of corporate motivation. This 
perspective opens up new areas of research, such as the possible link between corporate 
motivation for social engagement and its contribution to broader social development. We 
suggest that our matrix can be used as a tool to further evaluate the nature of motivation, and 
to assess how particular motivational factors impact the depth and ultimate outcome of TNC 
social activity. 
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
various forms of corporate social engagement and outlines different forms of corporate social 
activities. The following section maps out various theoretical approaches to explaining firm 
5 
 
behaviour organised along the internal/external and structure/agency dimensions described 
above. Here we highlight the strengths and limitations of each theoretical approach in 
explaining TNC behaviour and the interconnections between them. Section 4 develops our 
proposed approach to studying corporate motivation for social engagement. In conclusion, we 
speculate that different triggers for social engagement might result in different social effects 
and we suggest that aligning motivation and outcomes could be the basis for fruitful future 
research.  
 
2. Modes of Corporate Social Engagement 
The number of TNCs has increased from about 37,000 in 1990 to 63,000 in 2002 (Chandler 
and Mazlish 2005: 2). At the same time, their activities have spread widely across the globe, 
connecting with millions of smaller firms that supply to or connect with their work. A number 
of TNCs have been active in social initiatives. While only a small percentage of TNCs 
participate in large-scale social and environmental certification schemes and in multi-
stakeholder initiatives (Utting 2005), more than 2,900 TNCs are members of the Global 
Compact (Berger, Cunningham and Drumwright 2007) and an increasing percentage of TNCs 
in the Fortune 500 and other indices engage in some form of social activity (KPMG 2008; 
Economist 2008: McKinsey 2008). 
 
From a historical perspective, corporate social engagement is not new. In the early days of the 
Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America firms provided housing for their workers 
and contributed to financing local schools and hospitals. With the emergence of politically 
organised labour movements, an increasing number of firms also adopted labour standards 
concerning work hours, minimum wages and child labour. Similarly, some large firms 
operating in the colonies and later in the independent states of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and 
Latin America sometimes provided housing and basic healthcare for their workers  (see, for 
example, Ritter 1998; Fraser 1984). 
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With the emergence of the welfare state in Europe and North America, the provision of basic 
social services and the regulation of labour standards came to be seen as largely the 
responsibility of the state. Corporate social engagement never disappeared, but its form in 
most industrialised countries changed from direct responsibility for worker and community 
well-being to a philanthropic focus. Increasingly, philanthropy has come to be used 
strategically as a form of social investment (Baron 2001; Porter and Kramer 2002). For 
instance, firms use donations to catalyse or complement business activities either in the ways 
discussed above, through investments in health or education, or via strategic marketing in 
which a percentage of revenues are donated to a particular cause (WEF 2006).  
 
Apart from firms’ engagement in activities related to the wellbeing of their workforce, a 
rather new phenomenon is corporate social engagement via companies’ participation in 
private and/or public-private governance schemes at the national and transnational levels 
(Falkner 2003; Mattli 2003; Gulbrandsen 2004). One example is the use of Corporate Codes 
of Conduct (CoCs), which many TNCs have adopted in areas ranging from labour practices to 
environmental standards. Some CoCs have been developed by individual TNCs that try to 
implement them not only across their global network of subsidiaries but also along their chain 
of suppliers. In other cases, CoCs have been formulated by industry associations that 
encourage their member companies to adhere to these principles and, in a few cases, have 
even made their adoption mandatory. Other sources of CoCs are international organisations 
(IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which have then invited companies to 
join (O’Rourke 2003). A variant of CoCs are certification and labelling schemes that exist for 
various areas of corporate social and environmental performance. Like CoCs, certification 
and labelling schemes have been developed by business actors, such as industry associations, 
NGOs, and sometimes in a collaborative effort. Neither CoCs nor certification schemes are 
legally binding, but certification schemes usually require that compliance is monitored. The 
extent and quality of monitoring, however, varies considerably and rarely involves the state 
(Brown and Locke 2008; Lim and Philips 2008; Locke et al. 2006).  
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In addition, a growing number of firms also engage in social activities through so-called 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) with governments and IOs (WEF 2006). Such partnerships 
operate on local, national, regional and global levels and have been initiated both by the 
private and the public sector. Usually, they are formed to address a specific problem, such as 
the lack of infrastructure, the HIV/AIDS pandemic or the illegal trade in diamonds from areas 
of civil conflict. Such initiatives are promoted as an effective way to create synergies and 
combine critical resources, such as financial resources, technical expertise, local knowledge 
and enforcement capabilities.  
 
What all of these practices have in common is that the firm assumes a role beyond that of a 
purely economic actor, engaging more broadly in social and also some political activities that 
have significance for its stakeholders and the broader communities in which it operates. It is 
this role that has grown and taken new forms in the late 20th and early 21st century. Attempts 
to explain this phenomenon have focused largely on the ‘business case’ for such engagement. 
Definitions of the ‘business case’ vary, but the basic idea is that a firm’s social engagements 
should align with and enhance its primary business activities. The roots of this argument can 
be found in neoclassical economic theory, with its assumption of rational action and profit-
maximising motivations. The ‘business case’ also answers the concern of sceptics of 
corporate responsibility who take the position of Milton Friedman that ”there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game” (Friedman 1962: 133). As 
we argue below, however, we see individuals in firms and firms themselves as being 
motivated by various factors in addition to profit maximisation.   
 
The conceptualisation of the organisation inherent to the ‘business case’ argument is not 
necessarily the only one. Other theorists view corporations differently (see Brown and Fraser 
2006); as quasi-public institutions with responsibilities to stakeholders. From this perspective, 
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firms’ motivations are rooted in much broader considerations than just bolstering the bottom 
line. If firms truly involve stakeholders and are open to addressing their concerns, it is likely 
that social engagement will conflict at some point with shareholder value. Indeed much of the 
research on the ‘business case’ finds that profitability and social action are not always easy to 
reconcile (Vogel 2005). Finally, the ‘business case’ itself does not account fully for the timing 
of the ‘rise’ of corporate social engagement, or the wide variation in the scope and depth of 
different corporations’ actions. For these reasons, we need to understand more than the 
‘business case’ to fully grasp the social behaviour of firms.  
 
3. Theorising Social Engagement of Transnational Corporations 
What then can explain TNCs’ social engagement? Scholars from various disciplines have 
tried to answer this question; each of them presents a unique set of variables and theoretical 
approaches. We suggest that the different approaches to the study of corporate motivation can 
be classified along two dimensions: (1) whether they locate the cause of TNC behaviour 
inside or outside the firm, and (2) whether they trace the cause of TNC behaviour to 
structures or agents. Depending on which perspective one chooses, different language is used, 
different assumptions are made, different questions are asked and problems dealt with and 
different causes for TNC behaviour are emphasised. Mapping theories along these lines 
creates a 2-by-2 table (see Table 1 below), which summarises our categorisation of potential 
motivations for corporate social behaviour. Each box in the table denotes the set of variables 
that are emphasised by the different disciplinary ‘lenses’, i.e. political sciences (I), IR and 
governance studies (II), organisational theory/sociology (III) and management studies (IV). 
The table illustrates that numerous variables possibly impact corporate social behaviour. In 
the following paragraphs, we probe these variables further, elaborating how they explain 
motivations and what a narrow perspective on any one dimension overlooks.  
 
      Table 1: Four sets of explanations of Corporate Social Engagement 
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Structure Actors 
 
External 
 
Competitive Landscape
National Institutions 
Global Institutions 
Public Norms 
I
Pressure from NGOs 
Pressure from IOs 
Actions of competitors 
and business partners 
II 
 
Internal 
 
III
Organisational 
Structure 
Corporate Culture 
Nature of the firm’s 
business 
IV 
Managers’ values/beliefs 
Manager’s leadership 
abilities 
 
 
3.1 The Global Economic and Normative Context 
TNCs’ behaviour is influenced by the economic, political and cultural contexts in which they 
operate. A number of recent studies have evaluated how national context impacts the depth 
and nature of corporate social engagement (Aguilera et al. 2006; Bondy et al. 2004; Welford 
2004; Maigan and Ralston 2002). Most of these studies find a significant difference in the 
behaviour of firms emanating from different countries or regions. The variation is explained 
through differences in culture and political and legal institutions; such as the laws on 
corporate governance, for example (Beltratti 2005; Aguilera and Jackson 2003). Other studies 
have emphasised community level factors, with isomorphism as the main mechanism 
transferring values across to corporate leaders (Marquis et al. 2007). Campbell (2007) 
emphasises that corporate behaviour is not a direct response to their economic environment 
but mediated by institutional factors, including regulation, the presence of independent 
monitoring organisations, institutionalised norms and expectations about corporate behaviour, 
associative relations between firms, and institutionalised stakeholder dialogue.   
 
In addition, there is evidence to suggest that increased corporate social activities may be 
linked to globalisation (Scherer and Palazzo 2007; Davis et al. 2006). We see three ways that 
globalisation may structure the social behaviour of firms. First, globalisation has contributed 
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to the geographical expansion of TNCs to places that are characterised by severe social 
problems and the absence of institutions to resolve them. In some cases, corporate social 
engagement appears to have been a reaction to this situation. Secondly, globalisation has in 
many ways strengthened the power of TNCs vis-à-vis states, which has placed them in a 
position that they are called upon to make political and social decisions. Third, the global 
expansion of trade has spurred transnational social movements which pressure corporations to 
take on greater responsibility for the social and environmental consequences of their 
operations, especially in the developing world. These three phenomena have put an increasing 
number of corporations in a position where they need to respond socially and politically 
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007). 
 
In many locations where TNCs operate today they encounter problems such as profound 
poverty, social instability or health epidemics such as HIV/AIDS or malaria. In addition, they 
are often faced with weak or unfamiliar institutional environments (Khanna and Palepu 
2005).  In some cases, these problems pose a direct risk to the firm, for instance if it relies on 
a consistent labour force, regional suppliers or local markets. Under these conditions, firms 
may view social action as a key component of their non-market strategy (see Porter and 
Kramer 2002). Sometimes, social activities may be the response to more indirect threats, 
including reputational risks and unsafe working conditions for ex-patriot staff. The globalized 
economy requires firms to balance opportunities and pressures to expand with the challenges 
posed by the severe social and environmental problems and institutional voids that exist in 
many of the places they go.  
 
Globalisation has not only compelled the geographic expansion of the firm, but has also 
changed the range and extent of state activities in the economic and social sphere (see 
Campbell 2007). This is significant for understanding firms’ social activities because it may 
be argued that the lesser states do to address market externalities, the greater the sphere of 
activity left to the firm. This is not to suggest that this is a zero-sum game; but state 
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withdrawal opens a space where firms or other non-state actors may feel that they need to step 
in, substituting self-regulation for state regulation. Indeed, the growth of corporate social 
engagement in recent years has gone hand in hand with deregulation movements in both the 
developed and the developing world; and with corporate expansion of firms to areas of the 
world where states are characteristically weak. This is illustrated for example in the case of 
labour rights. Poor working conditions in developing countries have very often been seen as 
the responsibility of TNCs. Indeed in many known cases, governments have not even been 
targeted by critics to address these issues, but corporations such as Nike or the Gap have. In 
these cases, it has been the co-existence of weak governance and business rationale that gave 
rise to social initiatives. It has even been argued that history points to an ebb and flow of 
corporate social engagement, with corporations assuming more responsibility in the early 
period of industrialisation and increasingly less as the regulatory state emerged (Mathis 2005; 
Wilkins 2005, 1998). 
 
The extent to which states have actually withdrawn from social and environmental activities 
as a result of globalisation is a contentious issue. Some argue that open capital and trade 
flows require states to lower taxation and regulatory impediments to investment and 
competition (Friedman 1999; Strange 1996; Ohmae 1995). From this perspective, the sphere 
of state activity is becoming inevitably smaller as internationalisation proceeds. Others argue 
that states have minimized their regulatory and welfare roles in economies for ideological 
reasons more than from compulsion. Deregulation in this perspective is a set of political 
choices largely made by leaderships that embrace market liberalisation as optimal policy 
(Standing 2002; Ferge 1999; Albert 1993). Still others argue that the decline of the state in 
globalisation is neither inevitable nor desirable (Chang 2003; Rodrik 1998). Evidence exists 
to show that states in the OECD have in fact ‘withdrawn’ from regulatory and welfare 
activities to different extents and selectively over time (Swank and Steinmo 2002; Garrett 
1998). In the developing world, the situation is far more complex. Competition for foreign 
investment combined with political pressure has often compelled deregulation and, in many 
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instances, driven down rates of taxation to below zero (Koenig-Archibugi 2004; UNCTAD 
1995: 291ff .; McKenzie and Lee 1991). It does not necessarily follow from this, however, 
that corporations will ‘step in’ to fill in where states are no longer active. This would only 
occur where market externalities are problematic for the firm and to understand this we need 
to evaluate the business case or leadership motivations that structure corporate responsibility 
endeavours.  
 
States, however, are not completely without power in the global system, and the actions and 
potential actions of governments can still significantly impact corporate behaviour. What 
states have that other actors in the international system do not have is sovereignty. Abbott and 
Snidal (2006) for instance try to answer the question of governments’ obsolescence with 
regard to TNCs. They argue that the state “continues to play a significant, though modified, 
role: increasingly the state operates not through coercion, but through leadership, 
coordination, legitimation and support; it performs these functions not in the foreground, but 
in the background.” (ibid.) States can enact laws on human rights, finance, trade and 
investment. Some countries seem to pay more attention to CSR than others; such as the UK 
which has a CSR public official. Moreover, the possibility that governments will employ 
sovereignty to regulate is often perceived as a motivation for some firms for pre-emptive 
initiatives (Scheinberg 1999).5 
 
Globalisation has also entailed a normative shift that has at once empowered corporations and 
given rise to demands for corporate social engagement. TNCs are the primary drivers of and 
winners from globalisation. This fact not only elevates their power but also widens the 
domain for which corporations may be held responsible. Furthermore, as globalisation has 
proceeded, the negative consequences of economic opening have become apparent. 
Inequalities and inequities in the current order of globalisation constitute the broad focus of 
                                                 
5 In the context of the neocorporatism literature, this is called the “shadow of the hierarchy” (Mayntz 
and Scharpf 1995). 
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the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement and of more moderate proponents of reform. From one 
perspective, the rise of social movements calling for a more just process of globalisation can 
be seen as a direct outcome of globalisation itself. Ruggie (2003), for example, draws on 
Polanyi’s notion of a ‘double movement’ to explain emerging calls for more global social 
justice. Polanyi argues that the attempt to increase the role of self-regulating markets impels 
society to seek protection specifically from national governments (Polanyi 1944/2001). 
Ruggie, describing the growth of the regulatory state in post-war Europe (Ruggie 1982), 
accepts that globalisation in the late 20th century has rendered states less able to protect 
society from the vicissitudes of the market. Thus society calls upon the new power holders, 
corporations, to address the social and environmental ills that open markets have created.  
However, the McKinsey Social Responsibility survey (2006) suggests that global ‘norms’ of 
corporate social behaviour have not yet emerged.  
 
While these factors – the global expansion of corporate activity, the weakening of states and 
the growth of global social pressure – all provide motivations for firms to socially engage, 
they cannot alone explain the extent and nature of that engagement. In reality, firms exposed 
to a very similar external context differ with regard to their social activities. Shell, for 
example, takes a comprehensive approach to community development when it extends to a 
country where there is weak governance and minimal infrastructure, but other firms take a 
much narrower approach to engaging communities where they invest. A recent survey by the 
Economist found ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ on CSR, with plenty of the latter (Economist, 17 
January 2008). The numerous ratings of companies on responsibility measures also show 
significant variation across firms in similar sectors with a like amount of global exposure; 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) is one example of a respected 
rating group. Explanations to why firms respond differently to similar social, environmental 
and political challenges may be found by focussing on firm-level factors, such as 
organisational routines, the nature of the business the firm operates in, corporate culture, and 
the personal values and beliefs of key decision makers within the firm. Another set of 
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explanations may be found by investigating whether and how external structural conditions 
are taken up by stakeholders of the firm, including NGOs, investors and IOs, for instance, 
who use their respective positions to put pressure on the firm.  
 
Conventional political science and IR literature looking at the role TNCs play vis-à-vis the 
state and in influencing global regulatory structures explains firms’ motivation to engage in 
these processes often by drawing on structural factors, such as changes in the global economy 
and the distribution of power between states and corporations. However, structural conditions 
induce behavioural responses only if they are taken up by individuals or groups and translated 
into action. Studies that seek to explain the social behaviour of TNCs as a response to 
external conditions therefore need to combine structural approaches with theoretical lenses 
that illuminate the role of actors. 
 
3.2 External Actors  
Among the many external actors that influence TNCs social engagement are states, IOs, 
NGOs and transnational advocacy networks, and socially responsible investors. They are part 
of an emerging system of global governance, conceptualized as “formal and informal bundles 
of rules, roles, and relationships that define and regulate the social practices of state and non-
state actors in international affairs” (Mattli 2001: 332). IR and governance studies attempt to 
understand TNC social engagement by looking at the distribution of power in the global 
governance system and in particular the impact NGOs and IOs have to hold TNCs 
accountable. Hall and Biersteker (2002) for instance argue that boundaries between the 
domestic and the international arenas are blurring and a growing number of non-state actors 
have appeared in the international system. Gereffi et al. (2001) have stressed the power of 
NGOs in naming and shaming TNCs for socially irresponsible behaviour. Abbot and Snidal 
(2006) develop the concept of a “governance triangle” of firms, NGOs and the state 
(including IOs). 
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The number of NGOs, their geographical reach and their participation in the formulation and 
implementation of global governance have risen significantly throughout the last decade (Boli 
and Thomas 1999; Fox 1998). According to Sikkink and Smith (2002), there are more than 
30,000 NGOs which operate international programmes. Governments and IOs increasingly 
rely on NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and development assistance. The World Bank for 
instance employs former NGO members and activists for their particular expertise (Vetterlein 
2007; Davis 2004; Fox 1998). This has increased their capacity to affect corporate behaviour. 
These developments allow NGOs to actively participate in development policies. Being part 
of operational activities means having a certain degree of decision-making power rather than 
just voicing critique. Private transfers and donations to the developing world are also 
channelled through NGOs. For example, Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) find that in the fiscal 
year 1998, twelve large INGOs disposed of about $3 billion and more than 27,000 staff 
worldwide. As Gereffi (2001) points out, NGOs have now become increasingly pro-active in 
naming and shaming corporations and act as policy entrepreneurs for global social matters 
(Gereffi 2001). At the same time, they also collaborate with firms to address social and 
environmental problems, for example through the provision of consultancy services, 
especially in developing countries (interviews in Bangkok, September 2007). 
 
Among the best-known public campaigns by NGOs against TNCs are Coca Cola and its 
HIV/AIDS initiative in Africa (Ruggie 2004), Nike and the sweatshop campaign (Locke et al. 
2006; Johns and Vural 2000) or DeBeers and blood diamonds (Bone 2004). However, there is 
evidence that NGOs’ naming and shaming campaigns have not always yielded the desired 
responses and can therefore not by themselves explain corporate social behaviour. In fact, 
public campaigns seem to be effective mainly if the targeted companies are sensitive to their 
public image. The reason for this is that consumers have been found to pay increasing 
attention to where, by whom and under what conditions the product has been produced 
(Heidkamp et al. 2007), which makes companies with direct consumer-facing and especially 
those with brands to protect particularly sensitive to NGO campaigns. While the activities of 
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advocacy groups have been an important factor in shaping TNC social behaviour in 
individual cases, we have to include firm-level factors such as the nature of the business the 
company works in, in order to provide explanations that go beyond individual case studies 
and to account for variation between firms.  
 
Similar to NGOs, IOs have an impact on corporate reputation to affect TNC social behaviour. 
Their position as inter-governmental organisations does not allow IOs to directly engage in 
naming and shaming campaigns. However, they are endowed with a certain amount of 
authority and legitimacy regarding policy agenda setting (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 
1999). IOs have used their authority as representatives of the international community as well 
as their technical expertise to shape the normative context in which TNCs operate including 
by developing benchmarks for appropriate social and environmental behaviour. Examples are 
the International Labour Organisation’s Multinational Enterprises Programme (MULTI), the 
OECD’s guidelines for multinational enterprises (OECD 2000) or the United Nations’ Global 
Compact (United Nations 2000). In some cases, IOs are able to exercise economic leverage 
over firms. For example, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the only body of the 
World Bank Group mandated to formally engage with the private sector, attaches conditions 
to its loans, including social and environmental standards (Park 2005).  
 
However, with few exceptions, the monitoring and enforcement capacity of IOs is weak and 
their ability to shape corporate social behaviour dependents on their ability to frame the terms 
of the international debate and thereby target firms’ concern about their reputation with both 
the public and policy makers. While such forms of soft power may not always be effective 
(Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 247f.) they are nevertheless important because they shape the 
normative environment in which TNCs are embedded. In comparison to NGOs, IOs due to 
their greater legitimacy may have first a greater potential to shape the normative context of 
TNCs by political agenda-setting, second more authority in exercising soft power through 
naming and shaming strategies and third at least theoretically the capacity to enforce norms. 
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Ruggie’s latest report to the Human Rights Council6 that proposes a legalization of corporate 
responsibility regarding human rights with IOs as the main responsible actors can be seen as a 
step into this direction (Ruggie 2008). In sum, there is evidence that TNCs’ responses to the 
benchmarking initiatives of IOs have varied greatly both across industries and countries and 
within them. We suggest that further research in this area focuses on how firm-level factors 
shape TNCs’ susceptibility to such forms of soft power.  
 
A third group of external actors that have exercised significant influence on TNC behaviour is 
socially responsible investors, which comprise no longer only small, specialised retail funds 
but increasingly also large institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies (Sparkes and Cowton 2004). The means available to this group to influence TNC 
behaviour differ from both those usually employed by NGOs and IOs. Investors, particularly 
the large institutional funds, can directly affect companies’ financial bottom line. While there 
is evidence that socially responsible investors can thereby exercise considerable influence on 
corporate social behaviour, the relationship is far from straightforward (Collier 2004). There 
is evidence, for instance, that the outcome is shaped by managers’ attitude and perception of 
socially responsible investment. Managers’ attitudes are, in turn, partly shaped by the degree 
of institutionalisation of socially responsible investment, which differs greatly across 
countries.  
 
In conclusion, while external actors can exert significant influence on TNCs social behaviour, 
this factor alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for corporate social engagement. 
Neither can it explain inter- and intra-industry variation nor the recent rise in corporate social 
activities. There is evidence to suggest that the outcome is shaped strongly by firm-level 
factors, including both the nature of the firm’s business and managers’ orientation and their 
perception of the legitimacy of socially responsible investment and shareholder activism. 
                                                 
6 This report was conducted in his position as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the issue of human rights and TNCs. 
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While there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the growing attention paid to the social and 
environmental externalities of transnational business operations by actors outside the firm has 
contributed to the rise of corporate social activity in recent years, there are large gaps in our 
understanding of how exactly different strategies employed by external actors translate into 
changes in corporate behaviour and, consequentially, which factors account for variation in 
outcome. In order to answer those questions, a closer look inside the firm is indispensable.  
 
3.3 The Internal Structure of the Firm 
A third set of variables to explain corporate social behaviour can be derived from 
management studies. We hypothesize three ways in which the internal context of the firm can 
impact corporate social behaviour. First, the organisational structure of the firm determines 
the degree to which social and environmental concerns become integrated or remain 
tangential to the main line of business. When social activities are kept ‘siloed’ in an 
organisation, the effect is often a mitigated degree of engagement. This is illustrated by firms 
that have implemented codes of conduct requiring suppliers to adhere to labour standards 
even if costs are increased, but at the same time pressure their internal buyers to shop 
exclusively for product ‘price’. With regard to the impact of organisational structures and 
routines, greater attention to insights from the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and 
March 1964) might yield interesting results. Companies that have created organisational 
routines to deal with social, environmental and political challenges are not only more 
successful in dealing with them but also more prone to initiate activities. The reason for this is 
that internal organisational routines facilitate access to information, mitigate uncertainty and 
thereby facilitate individual decision making and action. As studies on corporate political 
activities have illustrated, companies that have created institutionalized responses of 
identifying and responding to political challenges tend to be more actively involved in 
political affairs (Rehbein and Schuler 1999). The role that internal organisational routines 
play in facilitating corporate social activities may therefore be a promising direction for future 
research. 
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Second, corporate behaviour is shaped by the organisational culture. The concept of corporate 
culture denotes the set of values, beliefs, policies and practices that shape decision making, 
action and social relationships between individuals in a company. Different cultures 
emphasise different values including those related to corporate social behaviour, such as 
investments in employees and adherence to environmental standards. It is easy to imagine that 
an organisation such as Ikea, for example, would have a high inclination to engage as a social 
actor where it invests because of its inherent culture; particularly its values on stake-holders 
and long term perspective. Arena describes these types of firms as ‘high purpose companies’ 
(Arena 2006). Berger et al. (2007) found that certain dimensions of corporate culture were 
linked to specific types of CSR. Firms with comparatively flat hierarchies and participative 
stakeholder engagement often pursued social activities in a broad range of areas and tried to 
integrate economic and non-economic rationales for social engagement in their initiatives, a 
type of CSR labelled ‘syncretic stewardship’ (ibid.). Bhandari and Abe (2001) also show how 
firms that decide to commit to responsible environmental practices find it necessary to engage 
in a process of deliberate cultural change. Canon and Toyota for instance (ibid.: 73-74), 
which provided extensive employee training and internal communications to boost 
environmental awareness and deliberately change organisational culture toward the ends of 
better environmental practice. 
 
Third, there is evidence that the nature of the business that the TNC is in is also 
determinative. As mentioned above, firms that are directly consumer-facing tend to be more 
vulnerable to public advocacy campaigns. Furthermore, they are also more vulnerable to 
reputation damage from health concerns related to their products. Since many health 
problems arise from negligent labour and environmental practices, these firms may have a 
greater incentive to engage actively in these areas. Taking the lead from the ‘varieties of 
capitalism literature’, another firm-related factor concerns the skills required by the firm’s 
production. Firms that depend a great deal on skilled labour will have a greater incentive to 
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invest in labour force retention as well as in broader community efforts focused on education, 
teacher training, etc. (Mares 2003). Intel in Russia for example has invested extensively in its 
existing employees and in building up a workforce for the future in Russia.7 But it appears to 
not just be the ‘business case’ that inspires Intel; the support it receives from government 
suggests that its activities contribute to its license to operate. Moreover, Intel promotes its 
activities as CSR to enhance its reputation as a global organisation, and is hence clearly 
responding to the types of external pressures described above. Finally, the nature of the 
business also determines the extent of social and environmental externalities a firm creates. 
Extractive and chemical industries have to undertake much greater health and safety efforts in 
order not to expose their employees and surrounding communities to serious risks than the 
publishing or financial industries, for instance.  
 
The firm level structures described here become significant explanatory variables only in 
combination with factors outside the firm. For instance, direct consumer facing becomes a 
significant driver for social engagement only if there exists some awareness among 
consumers about methods of production and health risks. Furthermore, the impact of such 
structural conditions on corporate behaviour may be significantly facilitated by external 
actors, such as advocacy and consumer organisations, who mobilise consumers and policy 
makers and therefore put pressure on TNCs to adjust their behaviour. Furthermore, firm level 
structures are the direct result of individual actions within the firm. Company employees and 
senior managers in particular influence corporate culture and the establishment of 
organisational routines. As will be illustrated in the next section, theoretical approaches 
focussing on the role of internal actors therefore shed light on another set of important 
variables to explain corporate social behaviour.  
 
3.4 Internal Actors  
                                                 
7 http://www.intel.com/community/russia/index.htm 
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The fourth set of variables is theoretically located in organisation theory and focuses on actors 
within the corporation, i.e. the company management and operational staff. These actors are 
important to explain corporate social behaviour since decisions regarding such activities are 
made by individuals within the company (Collier and Esteban 2007). Empirical studies 
document that formal ethics policies were ineffective if they were not supported by leaders of 
the organisation, both on the executive and supervisory level (Trevino et al. 1999). Yet, 
despite numerous anecdotes illustrating the influence of managers on corporate behaviour, 
little systematic research has been carried out on the relationship between characteristics of 
internal actors and corporate social engagement. From the studies that do exist, three aspects 
of agency can be identified that seem to be particularly relevant for how individuals within 
the firm shape corporate social engagement, managers’ values/beliefs, conceptual capacity 
and leadership skills. 
 
Personally held values and beliefs of managers can shape the company’s social engagement 
in two ways. Firstly, managers’ values directly inform the decisions they make for the 
company. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) illustrate how the business strategies of firms such 
as Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream, The Bodyshop and Newman’s Own have been informed by 
both market considerations, such as how to achieve product differentiation, and the personal 
values and interests of senior managers in issues of social justice, animal rights and the 
environment. Berle and Means (1932:124) give the example of a manager who would 
“maintain labor standards above those required by competitive conditions” for “reasons of 
professional pride” (which brought him in opposition to the interests of the owners). 
 
Secondly, personal values of managers can affect the firm’s social activities through their 
impact on other employees and their respective values, behaviour and decision-making. 
Recognising that the commitment of employees is key to the ethical performance of the firm, 
Collier and Esteban (2007)  ask which factors create the necessary employee ‘buy-in’. They 
find that employee commitment strongly depends on the ‘tone from the top’ and the extent to 
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which social activities are championed by management. Berger et al. (2007) develop the 
concept of the ‘internal market for virtue’ in order to capture the important role that senior 
managers’ ‘demand’ for social engagement plays in creating the ‘supply’ of such activities by 
company employees. Trevino et al. (2000) argue that the significance of senior manager’s 
social and ethical stance is particularly important in the current era where more employees are 
working off-site and in separate offices around the globe. What holds these companies 
together “is values and values must be infused from the leading people of the organisation” 
(ibid.: 128). Yet, personal values held by people below the top management can also have 
significant effects on the company’s social activities. Drumwright (1994) finds that it was 
often ‘well-respected middle managers’ who brought about change in the companies’ buying 
policies. Their efforts were based mainly on personal commitment “involving a complex and 
often difficult process of moral reasoning” (ibid.: 4).  
 
The impact of managers on their employees has been studied through the concept of 
leadership. Two components of leadership can be distinguished, emotional and intellectual 
leadership, both of which might be important to understand corporate social behaviour. 
Emotional or so-called ‘charismatic leadership’, is relevant because it is based on the 
communication of strong messages about values and moral justifications (Shamir et al. 1993; 
Shamir 1991). Charismatic leadership may therefore play an important role in shaping the 
collective identity of the company and integrate social and ethical dimensions in this 
corporate culture. However, the authors find that it is the intellectual component of 
transformational leadership, which is more strongly associated with social activities. Rather 
than speaking to the emotions of the organisation’s employees, the intellectual component of 
transformational leadership is “geared towards the arousal and change in problem awareness 
and problem solving on the part of the followers” (Waldman et al. 2006: 1709).   
 
In the same way that the effectiveness of ethical leadership depends on the moral quality of 
the individual manager, the effectiveness of intellectual leadership depends on the person’s 
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conceptual capacity. Conceptual capacity, according to Waldman et al. (2006) is the “ability 
to integrate or process information pertinent to the environment (i.e. breadth of perspective), 
as well as deal with a high level of abstraction” (ibid.: 1709). This allows the manager to 
understand the ramifications that her company’s operations have on the natural and social 
environment and to conceive of ways of doing business in a way that benefits a wider group 
of stakeholders. In addition, the effect that managers’ conceptual capacity will have on the 
firms’ social activities depends on the manager’s ability to disseminate her approach and 
convictions throughout the organisation.  
 
The studies discussed have illustrated that individuals within the firm can play an important 
role in determining companies’ ethical and social behaviour. However, individual action does 
not happen in a vacuum but is significantly shaped by the context within which decisions are 
made and activities carried out. The importance of organisational structures in shaping 
individual decision making and action in firms has been conceptualised by the behavioural 
theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963). While most authors who focus on the role of firm 
internal actors in shaping corporate social behaviour at least implicitly acknowledge the 
significance of internal firm structures, this relationship is not often made explicit and needs 
to be explored more fully.  
 
Similarly, more work is needed to illuminate the relationship between internal actors and the 
external environment in shaping corporate social behaviour. The stakeholder theory of the 
firm represents one attempt to theorise about firm responses to external actors (Freeman 
1984) and has been applied to the question of corporate ethics (Phillips and Freeman 2003). 
From this perspective, corporate social engagement has been explained as companies’ 
strategic response to demands from various stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel 2001; 
Menon and Menon 1997) and, in the extreme, as a form of mere strategic image management 
(Adkins 1999). Such approaches work with the notion of the firm as a rational, profit-
maximising actor. They thereby neglect, however, insights from other research outlined above 
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which illustrates how structures inside and outside the firm constitute and constrain individual 
actions. Hemingway and Maclagan’s (2004) study is one of the few examples that tried to 
link theoretical foci on internal actors and external structures. The authors discuss the link 
between socially held values, such as those rooted in religion or cultural custom, and 
managers’ values. However, much more research is needed to improve our understanding of 
how structural and institutional changes in society are translated into management decision 
making on business social activity and institutionalised in organisational structures and 
routines. One example of approaching such questions may be through research on CSR and 
executive education (Matten and Moon 2004). 
 
In conclusion, conventional political science literature looking at the role of TNCs in the 
world economy largely draws on external structures to explain corporate social activities. 
More recently, scholars of global governance have emphasised the role of IOs and NGOs in 
influencing TNC social behaviour through their impact on the global discourse on corporate 
responsibility. Such approaches, however, remain on the outside of the firm and rarely 
consider firm-level variables to explain corporate decision making on whether or not and how 
to invest in social initiatives. Business or management studies have contributed to 
understanding the firm-level factors such as the ‘business case’ for CSR and the significance 
of norm entrepreneurs within corporations. However, those studies rarely take into 
consideration the broader political and societal context. The challenge therefore is to develop 
an integrated approach that seeks to connect the different disciplinary lenses and 
conceptualises the dynamics that connect internal and external influences in order to explain 
corporate motivation for social engagement. 
 
4. An Integrated Approach to the Study of TNC Motivation for Social Engagement 
An integrated approach to the study of TNCs’ social behaviour starts from the ontological 
assumption that both sets of categories, internal/external and structure/agency, are relational 
rather than exclusive and these relationships can go in both directions. We propose that the 
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dichotomy between internal and external is a false one because external factors have an 
impact on firm behaviour only in so far and through the way in which they are taken up by 
internal actors including, but not limited to, their interest in profit generation. At the same 
time, the external environment is created and shaped by firm practices. In other words, the 
tension, which leads to the need to act, is always a consequence of the interplay between 
external requirements and internal conditions.  
 
Similarly, we propose that the categories of structure and agency are linked and overlapping 
rather than dichotomous (on the structure-agency debate see Wendt 1999, 1991, 1987; 
Carlsnaes 1992; Dessler 1989; Giddens 1984, 1979). In line with relational approaches, we 
argue to focus on the interaction between structure and agency, which has epistemological, 
and subsequently, methodological consequences. Structuration theory for instance holds to 
the assumptions of structuralism about structure as generating and a relational aspect while 
simultaneously attempting to avoid the analytical separation between generative structure and 
actors and their activities. In other words: the analysis of social phenomena requires both 
structure and agency to be seen as potential independent variables. It is NGOs for instance 
and IOs that shape the normative and therefore material structure for firms that then sets the 
context in which firms make their decisions. The same is true for firm-internal structures that 
impact managers and other staff inside the firm. These organisational structures encompass 
formal rules and regulations, hierarchies, but also informal norms and set the incentives for 
individual behaviour and the context in which managers for instance translate external 
pressure for corporate social engagement into action. Based on these considerations, what has 
to be investigated in an empirical analysis are the actors’ dispositions as well as the political, 
economic and organisational context in which TNCs act. Yet, actors and context refer to 
within and beyond the firm.  
 
Following this ontological assumption, the study of TNCs’ behaviour can be considered to 
take place in two steps. In the first step, we consider TNCs to be embedded in a normative 
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and material context that consists of their market environment, national laws and customs, 
international rules and regulations, and external actors. The firm then is the dependent 
variable influenced by its environment. This first step therefore considers the conditions of 
the possibility of TNC behaviour. In a second step however, the firm itself, its organisational 
routines, corporate culture, and the personal idiosyncrasies of key decision makers become 
independent variables for explaining corporate social behaviour which specifically address 
the conditions of TNC action and changing behaviour.  
 
The utility of an integrated approach to understanding corporate motivation for social 
behaviour can be illustrated through a hypothetical example. Let us imagine a TNC with a 
long history of global operations, which at the start of the 21st century embarks upon a broad 
and substantive initiative to improve the social and environmental practices of its subsidiaries 
and suppliers in the developing world. There is no immediate imperative for this; the firm is 
profitable and has not suffered inordinately from reputation problems. Still, it is probably 
possible to construct a ‘business case’ for this endeavour, such as a realisation of potential 
reputation problems or a projected dearth of productive labour for its expansions. But, the 
business case itself only emerges in a particular context. ‘Reputation’ is an issue for the firm 
because of increased public awareness and the concomitant work of various external actors 
including non-governmental and international organisations. Certainly for Nike, it is the 
particular context of increased global activism that confronts them with the issue of corporate 
responsibility only in the 1990s (Zadek 2004). Nike had operated without such concerns since 
the early 1960s and was effectively ‘blindsided’ by the significance to its business of findings 
of labour abuses in its supplying factories. The Nike case illustrates the extent to which the 
external normative environment has influenced TNC s’ social engagement and the particular 
nature of it.  
 
Likewise, a business case for investing in workforce or community also emerges in the 
particular context of weak state action in this area. The most notable examples of this come 
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from the oil industry. Shell’s spectacular failures in Nigeria and the efforts required for it to 
achieve responsible business practice through extensive community development and 
sustainability initiatives is illustrative. Shell’s problems in Nigeria derived directly from the 
unstable political environment and deep-seated poverty in the country. As it turned out, Shell 
was neither able to exploit or ignore these issues, but has in fact made substantial investments 
with a variety of non-governmental partners into healthcare, education, youth programs and 
business development in Nigeria (Litvak 20068). British Petroleum and Statoil-Hydro, the two 
largest partners in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline similarly have had to make 
investment in the community a key part of developing the pipeline and have worked in 
partnership with NGOs and IOs extensively to develop community programs9. The absence of 
such investments subjects firms to severe reputational damage, to political risks such as 
expropriation and social instability. TNCs involved in natural resource for many reasons are 
required to ‘step in’ where states are absent. Research that evaluated the extent of TNC 
initiatives in areas with different degrees of state presence would shed light on the 
significance of this factor. However, we would likely find that some firms behave differently 
from others. Statoil-Hydro, for example, has been noted as a leader in driving initiatives in the 
BTC pipeline (Richardson 2008). It is also a company with a strong corporate culture, 
commitment to and experience with community and business development projects (Egset 
2007).  
 
The motivations of any TNC to be involved in the types of social engagement described here 
are shaped by factors inside the firm itself. There are infinite ways that firms can go about 
corporate social engagement in a rational and strategic manner. The focus and depth of 
TNC’s initiatives is likely to be influenced by the personal idiosyncrasies of those individuals 
who are responsible for it. Directors and managers alike will have perspectives on corporate 
social initiatives that reflect their personal ethics as well as the communities and cultures in 
                                                 
8 See also http://www.shell.com/. 
9 See http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9013062&contentId=7025624 and 
http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/Pages/default.aspx.  
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which they practice. In turn, their reactions to the challenges they perceive in the global 
operation and to the myriad pressures they confront from NGOs and other global actors will 
be mitigated through their personal moral framework. Finally, the depth and nature of the 
corporate social engagement will reflect the internal dynamics of the firm itself. How such 
initiatives are situated in the firm is essential; are its thought leaders confined to their own 
division or strictly to PR end of the firm? To what extent is ethical practice institutionalised as 
a norm throughout the firm? For example, does the organisational culture include a deep 
commitment to employees that is simply being extended to operations of its subsidiaries and 
suppliers? Organisational culture itself is a reflection of and changes with the external 
environment. Finally, the programme our TNC adopts affects the environment in which it 
operates in the future; whether it has created a best-practice or a misguided attempt at 
responsible business, as a powerful player in the world, its action sets a tone for itself and 
others to follow in the future.  
 
An integrative or two-step model approach has methodological consequences. We suggest 
that there would be value doing in-depth case studies that historically trace the evolution of 
social initiatives in a single firm over time. This does not mean that we are only able to 
achieve thick descriptions, but it allows us to hypothesize and explain how firms behave and 
what the causes may be for whether or not they engage socially, and to what extent. It permits 
a broader perspective of how and why different forms of social engagement are undertaken. 
Such an approach requires removing our disciplinary lenses and probing multiple domains of 
influence on corporate behaviour. Having a means of incorporating multiple influences into 
theories of TNC motivations also can align research with what corporations actually say. In a 
lecture at Oxford University, Marks and Spencer’s Manager for Sustainability was asked 
what is a very common question, ‘What is the real motivation for M&S’ ‘Plan A’?’ Stafford 
answered as most executives do: the sustainability plan is not just about the business case, 
although M&S does see itself responding to real customer demands. She emphasised the 
significance of the CEO’s values and commitment to sustainability and also mentioned the 
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complexities of sourcing in a global economy and the need to work effectively with often 
critical NGOs (Katie Stafford, Said Business School, Oxford 11 May 2007).  
 
The value of in-depth case studies becomes even more evident when combining it with cross-
case comparisons which would allow us to observe variation among cases that shed light on 
specific patterns of TNCs’ social activities. Small N studies that probe multiple influences on 
motivation can yield more refined understandings of the weight of various contextual and 
agency factors, and how they intersect in practice. Comparing processes and practices of 
TNC social engagement in different country settings in the same firm or in one contextual 
setting across different firms testing for corporate culture, sector or host country would allow 
us to derive configurations of conditions of TNC social engagement. Differently put, while 
the conditions for the possibility of TNC motivation (or the context) might be similar for 
different firms, by means of comparison we are able to detect mechanisms that operate 
differently according to the specific corporate practices which would allow us to detect 
patterns or develop a typology of TNC behaviour. This is in line with Weber’s method of 
ideal types (Weber 1973). Such types are abstractions of thick descriptions that, by 
comparison, highlight variation among cases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has mapped out theoretical approaches that have been used to explain TNC 
behaviour to address the question of why TNCs engage in social activities. The paper has two 
main goals: to illustrate the richness of the theoretical terrain, which contrasts with the 
paucity of conceptual underpinnings of much of the literature on corporate social activity, and 
to demonstrate how this rich theoretical terrain can be used to build a framework to help 
theory building in this field.  
 
The lack of theoretical clarity and depth in much of this literature is not surprising given that 
the object of these studies, the firm as a social actor, has only recently received broader 
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attention in the scholarly community. Moreover, the topic falls in between disciplinary stools. 
Scholars traditionally concerned with the study of public policy and governance have largely 
focussed on business’ relations with governments and state agencies. In political analysis, the 
firm has mostly been treated as a black box and conceptualised as a profit-maximising entity 
which reacts to external pressures and structural constraints. Management studies and 
organisation theory have extensively studied the inner workings of the firm and its interplay 
with the economic environment. The politico-institutional environment of the firm and its role 
within it, however, has received much less attention in these disciplines. 
 
Rarely has the attempt been made to systematically bridge the disciplinary and theoretical 
divides. This paper seeks to point to areas where bridges may be built between theoretical 
approaches. For instance, political science and IR have generated considerable knowledge 
about how globalisation has changed the normative and institutional character of regulation 
and how this, in turn, has affected the political and social space within which TNCs operate. 
However, such approaches are unable to account for much of the variation in TNC social and 
political behaviour that we observe. In order to address this question, it might be useful to 
systematically link such approaches with insights from organisation theory and management 
studies into the effects of different organisational structures, operation procedures, corporate 
culture, decision making processes and internal advocates on firm behaviour.  
 
The goal of this paper has not been to propose a theory that covers everything and anything 
but to propose a conceptual apparatus that can guide theory building about corporate social 
behaviour. In order to do so, we suggest the framework laid out in Table 1, which is not 
constrained by disciplinary foci and therefore open enough to capture potentially relevant 
factors and dynamics inside and outside the firm. The identification of the most potent 
explanatory variables through the methods discussed above may, in a next step, lead to more 
compact theories applicable to specific categories of firms or contexts.  
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Finally, the integration of a broader range of theories into the study of corporate social 
engagement might also open up areas for future research. For instance, much of the existing 
literature on corporate social activities has been concerned with the effectiveness of such 
initiatives in addressing social and environmental problems. Often, however, the discussion 
has centred on the normative question of whether or not TNCs should be active in this area. A 
better understanding of why TNCs engage in social programs and which factors determine 
their choice of strategy may help direct this debate towards the question of whether and under 
what conditions they could bring about social change. There is some empirical evidence to 
suggest that there may be a link between the determinants of corporate motivation to engage 
in social programs and the form and outcome of such initiatives. For instance, Berger et al. 
(2007) suggest that factors such as company size, the social commitment of company 
founders, and corporate culture have a bearing on the form and strategy of social activities. 
Studies on corporate initiatives to address child labour (Berlan 2005) have illustrated that in 
some of the cases where TNC social initiatives were triggered mainly by NGO pressure and a 
norm change in OECD countries, the social programs reflected the changing normative 
environment in the industrialised world and missed the needs of the alleged beneficiaries of 
the programs. Other scholars have pointed to the problem that codes of conduct and private 
certification schemes developed on the basis of norms and values in Northern countries have 
the potential to exclude many Southern producers from market access (for example, Ward and 
Fox 2002). 
 
Exploring potential links between firm motivation and policy outcome presents numerous 
methodological problems, most importantly the difficulty of measuring social outcomes. 
However, a better theoretical foundation for the study of corporate social behaviour may be a 
significant step forward. 
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